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Abstract 
 
Little attention has been given in the agricultural economics literature to the impact of off-farm work 
on farm productivity and efficiency. More knowledge about what determines part-time farming and 
whether farm productivity and efficiency are affected by part-time farming could help policy makers 
introduce better targeted rural development policies. This paper aims to fill the above-mentioned gaps 
by first analysing factors that influence the choice of off-farm work; and then examining how off-farm 
work influences productivity and technical efficiency at the farm level. An unbalanced panel data set 
from 1991 to 2005 from Norwegian grain farms is used for this purpose. 
The results show that the likelihood of off-farm work and the share of time allocated to it increase 
with increasing age (up to 39 years), and with low relative yields (compared to others farms in the 
surrounding area/region). The level of support payments is not significantly associated with the extent 
of off-farm work. Large-scale farms and single farmers tend to have a lower likelihood of off-farm 
work. 
Average technical efficiency was found to be 79%. Farmers with low variability in farm revenue 
were found to be more technically efficient than farmers with high revenue variability. We did not find 
any evidence of off-farm work share affecting farm productivity − the predicted off-farm work share 
was not statistically significant. In other words, we did not find any systematic difference in farm 
productivity and technical efficiency between part-time and full-time farmers. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In Norway farm income represents, on average, a relatively small and decreasing part of the total 
income of farm-family households. In 2004, only 22 per cent of the average total household income 
(for holder and spouse/cohabitant) came from agriculture, forestry and fishing. By contrast, in 1992, 
the income from these primary industries amounted to 27 per cent of total household income 
(Statistics Norway, 2006). Similar developments are found in many developed countries (e.g. Hill, 
2000; Andersson et al., 2003). For example, when considering large and very large commercial farms 
in U.S. the share of farm income in total household income ranges from 50 to 75 per cent (Goodwin 
and Mishra, 2004). 
 
Studies within a wide range of approaches and disciplines have examined characteristics and 
motivations that explain part-time and full-time farming. A number of studies examining time 
allocation by farm households have adapted theory from the “new household economics” (Becker, 
1981) to the special case of the agricultural household model (e.g. Huffman, 2001). Aspects examined 
in these studies include:  
a)  the characteristics of those participating in off-farm employment and the factors affecting 
labour supply (hours worked) in off-farm activities (Weersink et al., 1998; Woldehanna et al., 
2000);  
b)  the association between education and off-farm work (e.g. Huffman, 2001);    2
c)  the effect of differences in and variability of incomes/wealth between agriculture and other 
occupations (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Andersson et al., 2003; Fall and Magnac, 
2004); and  
d)  whether part-time farming is a stable adjustment, a way to full-time farming or way out of 
agriculture (e.g. Kimhi, 2000). 
 
Some attention has been given to the impact of off-farm work on production methods. Goodwin and 
Mishra (2004) provided support for the hypothesis by Smith (2002) that a greater involvement in off-
farm labour markets decreases on-farm efficiency. Phimister and Roberts (2006) explored the extent to 
which farmer participation in off-farm work changes the intensity on fertiliser and crop protection use. 
Ahituv and Kimhi (2006) analysed the simultaneous determination and evaluation over time of work 
choices and the level of farm activity. 
 
Little attention has been given to the impact of off-farm work on farm productivity and efficiency, 
even though Bateman et al. (1974) stressed that more knowledge was needed about extent to which 
productivity differs between part-time and full-time farmers. In one such study Bagi (1984) estimated 
a stochastic frontier production function and analysed differences in technical efficiency between full-
time and part-time farms in west Tennessee. Brümmer (2001) investigated, among other things, how 
technical efficiency differed between part-time and full-time farmers in Slovenia. Chavas et al. (2005) 
investigated the economic efficiency (technical, allocative and scale efficiency) of farm households in 
a peri-urban area of Gambia, thus capturing the importance of off-farm activities. Other similar studies 
appear to be rare. 
 
More knowledge about what determines part-time farming and whether farm productivity and 
efficiency are affected by part-time farming could help policy makers introduce better targeted rural 
development policies. This paper aims to fill part of the above mentioned gaps by: 
1.  analysing factors that influence the choice of off-farm work; and then  
2.  examining how off-farm work influences productivity and technical efficiency at the farm 
level. 
 
The rest of this paper is divided into four additional sections. The next section presents the conceptual 
framework, followed by a description of the dataset and estimation method. The subsequent section 
presents and discusses the main results of the analysis while the last section provides some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework  
 
Figure 1 outlines the hypothesised main causal relationships between farm and owner characteristics, 
support payments, share of owner’s time off farm, use of other inputs, and the productivity and 
















Figure 1. Assumed relationships between owner and farm characteristics, support payments, share of 
owner’s time off farm, other input use, and the farm productivity and efficiency. 
 
Earlier findings typically show that owner characteristics (such as farmer’s age, experience, marital 
status, education) affects share of owner’s time off farm (e.g. Huffman, 1980; Sumner, 1982; Serra et 
al., 2004, 2005; Ahituv and Kimhi, 2006: Lien et al., 2006). Previous studies also typically show a 
negative association between farm size and likelihood of off-farm work (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 
1997; Ahituv and Kimhi, 2002; Serra et al., 2005; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006). Farm characteristics 
such as yields, region, and urbanization may also influence the household time allocation decision 
(e.g. Sumner, 1982; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Goodwin and Mishra, 2004; Serra et al., 2005). In 
addition to these established factors, it was also assumed in this study that owner and farm 
characteristics will exogenously affect the extent of off-farm work. Moreover, since support payments 
may induce more or less off-farm work (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Ahearn et al., 2006), this 
aspect was also taken into account. Hence, as shown in Figure 1, in stage 1 we assume that owner and 
farm characteristics and support payments affect the share of owners’ time devoted to off-farm work.  
 
Many studies of grain farmers have investigated the optimal way of converting inputs into outputs, i.e. 
raising technical efficiency (e.g. Heshmati and Kumbhakar, 1997; Seyoum et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 
2001). Typically inputs included in the production function in these kinds of studies have been land, 
labour, materials and capital. Bagi (1984), Brümmer (2001) and Chavas et al. (2005) were, as far as 
we know, the only previous studies that has explicitly analysed whether off-farm work affects farm 
productivity and efficiency. In our study some of the farm characteristics, the support payments and 
other production input use were assumed to affect farm productivity and efficiency. In addition, an 
endogenous variable for the extent of off-farm work was also assumed to affect farm productivity and 
efficiency (Figure 1, stage 2). 
 
No model of this kind can be completely specified – mainly for lack of data. It is to be expected that 
the true model contains unmeasured farm or farmer-specific characteristics so that the chosen model is 
incomplete or misspecified. Agricultural production is heterogeneous (in topology, soil type, weather, 
luck, etc.) and farms differ in many ways, making it important that this heterogeneity is accounted for 
in production analysis (e.g. Just, 2000; Just and Pope, 2002). In the case of off-farm work share, 
heterogeneity may also be present because attitudes towards farm and off-farm work are likely to vary 
across individuals. Pride in being a farm operator, a preference for outdoor work, a family tradition of 
farming, attitudes to the environment, or simply individual tastes, are examples of such unobserved 
variables that typically are not accounted for by explanatory variables (e.g. Corsi and Findeis, 2000;   4
Ahituv and Kimhi, 2002). In this study, using farm-level panel data, unobserved heterogeneity was 
accounted for in both stage 1 and stage 2 of the model outlined in Figure 1, as explained below. 
 
 
3.  Data description 
 
The data source is the Norwegian Farm Accountancy Survey. This is an unbalanced set of farm-level 
panel data, collected by the Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute (NILF). It includes 
farm production and economic data collected annually from about 1000 farms, divided between 
different regions, farm size classes, and types of farms. Participation in the survey is voluntary. There 
is no limit on the numbers of years a farm may be involved in the survey. Approximately 10 per cent 
of the survey farms are replaced per year. The farms are classified according to their main category of 
farming, defined in terms of the standard gross margins of the farm enterprises. 
 
Because the on-farm work load on grain farms allows owners to combine farming with off-farm 
occupation to a large extent, this group was chosen for study. The data set used in the analysis was an 
unbalanced panel with 1491 observations on 178 grain farms from 1991 to 2005. Included in the 
analysis were those farms for which at least two years of data were available. In the sample used, the 
average duration of farms in the survey was 8 years. Grain farms usually have several grain production 
activities (wheat, barley, oats etc.). The total output is aggregated and measured in total produced feed  
units milk
2 (approximately equivalent to 1 kg barley) from crop production per year.  
 
3.1.  Econometric model 
 
Following Figure 1, we chose the following system to analyse the off-farm work decision and farm 
production: 
(1)  ( ) it it it
p
it it it u v y ; , f y − + + = 2 1 φ β z x  
(2)  () it i it it c ; h y ε + + = δ z 2          
where  = it y1 grain output for farm i  at time t;  ( ) β z x ; , f
p
it it  is the production technology;  it x  is the 
vector of inputs, 
p
it z  is a vector of control variables (farm characteristics affecting production) and β 
is the associated vector of technology parameters and parameters associated with the control variables 
to be estimated;  it y2  is off-farm work share and ϕ  is the associated parameter to be estimated; vit is a 
random noise term (production shocks); and  0 ≥ it u  is the inefficiency term. The inefficiency term is 
specified as  i t it u G u ⋅ = , with  ( ) t ~ exp Gt ⋅ = γ  where  t ~ is a time-trend inefficiency index and γ  is a 




i u i , N , N ~ u σ σ μ ς z •
+ + ′ = . The vector of inefficiency variables is 
denoted 
e
it z  and ς  is a vector of parameters to be estimated (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005). In the 
second equation;  () δ z ; h it  is a function of   it z  variables which constitute farm, owner and support 
                                                 
2 One feed unit milk (FUm) is defined as 6900 kJ of net energy.   5
payment characteristics and δ is the associated vector of parameters to be estimated;  ( )
2 0 c i , N c σ =  
represents the unobserved farm effect; and  ( )
2 0 σ ε , N it =  is the random error component.  
 
Thus we have a triangular system in which the first equation has two endogenous variables (y1 and y2) 
and the second equation has one endogenous variable (y2). The model allows off-farm work to affect 
output but not vice-versa. One could expect that greater involvement of the farmer in the production 
process is likely to increase output (or that increase off-farm work is likely to decrease output). On the 
other hand, less time for the production process may force an increased efficiency. In other word, the 
sign of the ϕ  coefficient is an empirical question.  
 
In the off-farm work equation we controlled for unobserved farm- or owner-specific effects (ci) which 
might be quite important. Some of these unobserved variables mentioned earlier are: preference for 
outdoor work and closeness to nature, family tradition, environmental values, etc. Such unobserved 
effects are also likely to affect output in (1). We viewed these effects as parts of management that is 
accommodated in the inefficiency term.  
 
The system in (1) and (2) can be estimated jointly. However, consistent estimates can also be obtained 
through the equation-by-equation procedure in two-steps. We used the two-step approach. In stage 1 
we modelled the decision about off-farm work. Factors that influence the choice of off-farm work 
were specified and estimated as a Tobit (Greene, 2008) because the dependant variable in equation (2) 
is specified as an intensity variable (ranging from 0 to 1) with the possibility that there might be many 
observations for which y2 is zero (farmers not working off-farm). Then, in stage 2 a stochastic 
production function was specified and estimated to examine how off-farm work influences 
productivity and technical efficiency at the farm level. At this stage, we replaced off-farm work share 
by its predicted value for each farm, obtained from stage 1. 
 
The  ( ) β z x ; , f
p
it it  function in equation in (1) was specified with the following input variables:  1 x  is log 
of productive farmland in hectares;  2 x  is log of labour hours used on the farm, measured as total 
number of hours worked, including management, family and hired workers;  3 x  is log of materials and 
machinery used in farm production (implicit quantity index). The broad machinery and materials 
variable
3 includes cash expenditures items for seeds, fertiliser, lime, pesticides, fuel, electricity, plus 
the maintenance costs of machinery, buildings, irrigation and land and the cost of hired machinery.
4 
Fisher’s implicit quantity index was used to specify the materials and machinery variable.
5 In addition 
                                                 
3 At the outset, we tried to include an additional input variable, building capital. However, we found it difficult to derive a 
good measure of building capital from the data because no physical capital measure was recorded. Another problem is that 
monetary values of buildings in the data set are based on historical cost, which is a poor basis for deriving the economic 
value of the services provided from the buildings.   
4 In calculating the aggregate measure machinery and materials, seed costs were deflated by the price index for seeds, 
fertiliser and lime costs were deflated by the price index for fertiliser, pesticide costs were deflated by the index for total 
variable costs, fuel costs were deflated by the fuel price index, electricity costs were deflated by the electricity price index, 
and maintenance costs of machinery, buildings, irrigation and land and the cost of hired machinery were all deflated by index 
for fixed costs. 
5 In general, when considering several inputs, we observe the vector of prices wj  and the vector of quantities, xjt (the implicit 
quantities of the individual items) for t = 1, …, T.  Then the Fisher index (e.g. Diewert, 1992) for the quantity of inputs used 
















jt jst x w x w x w x w x × = . The first term in the brackets is the cost   6
to these three ‘traditional’ input variables in a production function,  4 x  representing total subsidies 
received (implicit quantity index)
6 and a time-trend index, t (1, …, 15), to account for neutral 




it z  consist of regional dummies. We define two regions, viz., (a) the region with most 
favourable production conditions – labelled “favourable” (including Eastern Norway - lowlands, 
Jæren, and Mid-Norway - lowlands), and (b) the region with average and least favourable production 
conditions – labelled “other” (Agder and Rogaland, Western Norway, Mid-Norway - other parts, 
Eastern Norway – other parts, and Northern Norway). Within each of the regions the growing 
conditions are quite similar. To allow for time-varying efficiency, the vector  t ~  in the function  t G  in 
equation (1) is specified with  () 15 1 , , t L = .  
 
In the present analysis, we have chosen to define off-farm work share,  2 y , in equation (2) as the 
owner’s and spouse’s (if not single) total hours worked off the farm. The  it z  variables in equation (2) 
consist of:  1 z  is age of farmer in years; 
2
1 z  is age of farmer squared (to allow for the expected 
nonlinear effect of age);  2 z  is years of farming experience of the farmer;  3 z  is a dummy variable that 
has value one if the holder is married/has cohabitant and zero if single;  4 z  is the number of children in 
the household;  5 z  is the farm specific (within farm) coefficient of variation (CV) in total farm 
revenue;  6 z  is total subsidies received (implicit quantity index);  7 z  is productive farmland in hectares; 
8 z  is mean normalised yields (average individual farm level yields / average regional yields);  9 z  is 
centrality, with value 1 if the farm is located in the central municipalities and zero otherwise. This 
variable should account for the fact that the off-farm labour markets may be better in urban regions 
than in rural regions;  10 z  is a dummy for region equal to 
P z1  described above. Also include in  it z  was 
a time-trend index,  () 15 1 , , t L = . 
 
The variables in the inefficiency function consists of average (over time) values of: 
e z1  which is farm-
specific CV of farm revenue, chosen to represent variability in revenue at farm level (the same as 
variable  5 z ); 
e z2  which is farm-specific subsidies received (the same as variable  4 x ); 
e z3  which is 
farm-specific mean normalised yields; 
e z4  which is farmer-specific farming experience; and 
e z5  which 
is farm-specific predicted off-farm work share. 
 
In Table 1 the summary statistics of variables for the off-farm work choice function and for the 
production function with the error component are listed. On the basis of a standardised yearly labour 
input from one labour unit of 1845 hours, the average off-farm work share,  2 y , was 1.03. In other 
words, on average slightly more than one labour-unit (man-year) was spent on off-farm work per farm. 
The average farm size in the sample (30 ha) was higher than the average in Norway of 21 ha. On the 
                                                                                                                                                         
change between the two periods. The second term is the ratio of two values: period-t quantities valued at period-s prices; and 
period-s quantities valued at period-t prices. This formula was used to calculate the non-transitive implicit index for 
machinery and materials. 
6 Total subsidies received were deflated by the consumer price index (CPI).   7
other hand, the average age of farmer in the sample was 50 compared to 55 for Norway (Koesling 
et al., 2004).  
 
Prior to estimation, output and  x -variables in the translog function were scaled to have unit means, so 
that the first-order coefficients in the model can be interpreted as elasticities of output evaluated at 
input means. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistic (N= 1491) 
Variable Label  Mean  Std.dev  Min  Max 
1 y   Grain output (feed units)  116701  71126  10850  545103 
2 y   Off-farm work share
a  1.03 0.60 0.00 2.71 
1 x   Land  (ha)  29.2 14.4  4.2 78.5 
2 x   Labour used on farm (hours)  1344  899  50  6200 
3 x   Materials and machinery (index)  3.90  2.53  0.47  19.31 
4 x   Total subsidies received (index) 6.27  4.26 0.25  32.71 
p z1   Dummy for region, other = 1  0.30  0.46  0  1 
1 z   Age of the farmer (years)  49.3  8.8  26  72 
2 z   Years of farmer experience  17.76  9.58  0  46 
3 z   Holder is single, no = 1, else = 0  0.85  0.36  0  1 
4 z   Number of children   0.92  1.27  0  6 
5 z   Farm-specific CV
b in farm revenue  0.29  0.29  0.01  2.20 
6 z   Total subsidies received (index) 6.27  4.26 0.25  32.71 
7 z   Land  (ha)  29.2 14.4  4.2 78.5 
8 z  
Mean normalised yields (individual yields 
/ region yields)  1.01  0.52  0.17  3.36 
9 z  
Centrality, farm in central municipalities 
= 1, else = 0  0.73  0.44  0  1 
10 z   Dummy for region, other = 1  0.30  0.46  0  1 
e z1   Farm-specific CV
b in farm revenue   0.29  0.29  0.01  2.20 
e z2  
Farm-specific (average of the sample 
period) subsidies received (index)  6.15 3.59 0.70  31.24 
e z3  
Farm-specific (average of the sample 
period) mean normalised yields  1.01  0.52  0.17  3.36 
a Note, the predicted value of  2 y from equation (2) in stage 1 is used as a control variable in equation (1) in stage 2. 
b CV = coefficient of variation, which expresses the standard deviation in farm revenue relative to the mean farm revenue. 
  
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1.  The off-farm work choice function 
 
The censored equation (2) was estimated to assess the factors that influence the choice of off-farm 
work.
7 Parameter estimates for the model are presented in Table 2. The effect of farmers’ age on off-
                                                 
7 Before ending up with these first and second stage regression models presented in this result section, several alternative 
models were tested to check robustness. For example, we dropped the insignificant variables in the Tobit regression, without 
any important change of the significant parameter estimates of the Tobit equation and frontier production equation. To check 
the importance of the off-farm work share as a input in the frontier production function we ran the second stage frontier   8
farm work had an inverted “U” shape, with the peak at around 39 (below the average age of the 
farmers), which is in accord with the life-cycle hypothesis for the farm household that has also been 
supported in earlier studies (e.g. Huffman, 1980; Sumner, 1982; Serra et al., 2004, 2005; Ahituv and 
Kimhi, 2006). Contra to the finding of Mishra and Goodwin (1997) found that increasing experience 
decreases the share of off-farm work, the results in this study do not support the hypothesis that the 
experience of farmers influences the off-farm work share.  
 
Table 2. Tobit regression estimates for the off-farm work share choice equation   
Parameter Label  Estimate  Std.  Err.   
1 δ   Age of the farmer in years  0.097 (0.015)  *** 
sq _ 1 δ   Age of the farmer squared 
-0.001 (0.000)  *** 
2 δ   Years of farming experience  -0.002 (0.003)   
3 δ   Dummy, the holder is not single = 1  0.366 (0.037)  *** 
4 δ   Number of children  -0.035 (0.012)  ** 
5 δ   CV of farm revenue  0.072 (0.177)   
6 δ   Total subsidies received   0.006 (0.005)   
7 δ   Farmland  -0.005 (0.002)  * 
8 δ   Mean normalised yield  -0.222 (0.090)  * 
9 δ   Dummy, centrality = 1  -0.027 (0.076)   
10 δ   Dummy for region, other = 1  -0.208 (0.090)  * 
11 δ   Time-trend index  0.038 (0.003)  *** 
0 δ   Intercept  -0.860 (0.370)  *** 
2
c σ   Random effect variance  0.193 -(0.022)  *** 
2 σ   Random error term variance 
0.092 -(0.004)  *** 
Estimates significant at *P<0.05, **P<0.01 and ***P<0.001. 
 
As expected, farmers who are single generally worked less frequently off the property than non-single 
farmers. The presence of children in the farm household was found to have a significant negative 
effect on the off-farm activities of farmers and their spouses, supporting some earlier findings (e.g. 
Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Goodwin and Mishra, 2004) but contradicting the results of Ahituv and 
Kimhi (2006) who found that the presence of children did not significantly affect the supply of off-
farm labour. 
 
Our results do not statistically support the findings in earlier research (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; 
Serra et al., 2005) that higher variability in farm revenues increases the likelihood of off-farm work 
among the farm households.  
 
Government support payments may lessen the need for off-farm work by providing farm households 
with an alternative source of incomes, and this is empirically supported by, e.g. Mishra and Goodwin 
(1997) and Ahearn et al. (2006). However, our results indicate that support payments were not 
significantly associated with more off-farm work. In Norway, with generally a high standard of living, 
                                                                                                                                                         
production model adding (i) interaction of the predicted off-farm share with x2 (log of farm labor), and (ii) adding interactions 
of the predicted off-farm share with x1, x2, x3, and x4. These specifications did not change the statistical significance of the 
predicted off-farm share, and our result that off-farm share in the frontier production function is not important seem robust.   9
good welfare support and high overall wealth level, it is not surprising that the level of support 
payments tends to be independent off-farm work choices. 
 
The coefficient representing the effect of farm size was negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that large-scale farms tend to have a lower likelihood of off-farm work. This last result is 
consistent with previous findings (e.g. Lass, Findeis and Hallberg, 1989; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; 
Ahituv and Kimhi, 2002; Serra et al., 2005; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006). 
 
A farm’s productivity relative to other farms (average level of individual farm yields / average region 
yields) significantly influences the household time allocation decision. Our results support the 
expectation that more productive cropping farms would have higher relative returns to farm labour and 
thus supply less labour to off-farm activities. This result is also consistent with the findings of, e.g. 
Mishra and Goodwin (1997) and Serra et al. (2005).  
 
The probability for off-farm work was found to be higher in the most favourable region, compared to 
the region including farming conditions classed as favourable and least favourable. One explanation 
could be the better off-farm job opportunities in the most favourable region. But our results showed 
that distance to the nearest town (centrality) not statistically significant influence on farmers’ off-farm 
work share, which again was consistent with some earlier studies (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; 
Goodwin and Mishra, 2004). The time-trend index show that the off-farm work share has increased on 
average at 3.8% per year from 1991 to 2005. 
 
4.2.  The production function estimates 
 
In the second step of the analysis the general translog stochastic frontier production function model for 
grain output with the technical inefficiency effects specified in equation (1) was statistically tested 
against more restricted and parsimonious models. The first hypothesis specified was that the farmers 
are fully technically efficient or equivalently that the mean production function is adequate. This 
hypothesis was rejected at 0.001 significance level. The second hypothesis that a Cobb-Douglas 
frontier was an adequate representation of efficient production was also rejected. The null hypotheses, 
that the time-variant and time-invariant inefficiency variables in the model have zero coefficients, 
were also rejected by the data. The preferred model was therefore the stochastic frontier translog 
production function with the technical inefficiency module specified in equation (1). The parameters 
for this model are reported in Table 3 and discussed below. 
 
Estimated output elasticities with respect to the inputs of land, farm labour, and subsidies all differed 
from zero at the 0.1% significance level (5% for material and machinery). The elasticity for land was 
the largest, being more than 5 times the elasticities with respect to labour and machinery and materials. 
As expected, the total grain yield depended strongly on the area of land used. In line with our estimate 
of 0.81, Wilson et al. (2001) found an elasticity for land of 0.76 among wheat farmers in eastern 
England for the crop year 1992, and Wilson et al. (1998) found an elasticity for land of 0.87 in UK 
potato production.  
   10
Table 3.  Estimates of the parameters in the translog stochastic frontier production function for grain 
yield  
Parameter Label  Estimate  Std.  Err.   
Stochastic frontier    
1 β   1 x  (Log of land)  0.806 (0.077) *** 
2 β   2 x  (Log of farm labour)  0.146 (0.037) *** 
3 β   3 x  (Log of materials and machinery)  0.126 (0.053) * 
4 β   4 x  (Log of subsidies)  -0.241 (0.043) *** 
t β   t  (Time-trend index)  0.080 (0.010) *** 
11 β   1 x
2 
-0.285 (0.126) * 
12 β   1 x * 2 x   -0.037 (0.045)  
13 β   1 x * 3 x   0.190 (0.080) * 
14 β   1 x * 4 x   0.082 (0.065)  
t 1 β   1 x *t   -0.012 (0.009)  
22 β   2 x
2 
-0.010 (0.038)  
23 β   2 x * 3 x   0.024 (0.034)  
24 β   2 x * 4 x   0.093 (0.033) ** 
t 2 β   2 x *t   -0.012 (0.004) ** 
33 β   3 x
2  -0.033 (0.070)  
34 β   3 x * 4 x   -0.143 (0.047) ** 
t 3 β   3 x *t   0.001 (0.006)  
44 β   4 x
2  -0.015 (0.038)  
t 4 β   4 x *t   0.024 (0.005) *** 
tt β   t
2  -0.004 (0.001) *** 
1 C β   Dummy for region, others = 1  -0.111 (0.026) *** 
ϕ   Predicted off-farm work share  -0.006 (0.027)  
0 β   Intercept  -0.079 (0.059)  
Inefficiency model
a   
1 ς   Farm-specific CV of farm revenues  0.260 (0.093) ** 
2 ς   Farm-specific subsidies received  0.031 (0.007) *** 
3 ς   Farm-specific mean normalised yields  -0.688 (0.122) *** 
4 ς   Farmer-specific faming experience  0.000 (0.001)  
5 ς   Farm-specific predicted off-farm work share   -0.015 (0.034)  
0 ς   Intercept  0.578 (0.091) *** 
Time-variant inefficiency   
γ   Time-trend index  0.022 (0.012) * 
Variance parameters   
u σ   Standard deviation inefficiency model  -4.751 (0.335) *** 
v σ   Standard deviation error term  -3.110 (0.039) *** 
Estimates significant at *P<0.05, **P<0.01 and ***P<0.001. 
a A negative sign on a parameter indicates a positive impact on efficiency. 
 
The non-product-specific subsidy payments (almost all subsidies in Norway are now of this kind) 
showed a negative elasticity sign. This may partly be explained by increased non-product specific   11
support that are paid to promote rural viability, maintaining cultural landscapes, more environmentally 
friendly production (such as organic farming) and ensuring food security for times of crisis 
(Prestegard, 2004), which may all induce lower productivity (e.g. Oude Lansink et al., 2002; Ball et 
al., 2004).  
 
Scale economies were computed as the sum of all elasticities of input variables. On average, the scale 
elasticity was equal to 1.08 if subsidies were not included as a variable in the sum of elasticities of 
input variables, indicating that the production function exhibited increasing returns to scale at the 
means of the data. For crop farms in Sweden for the period 1976 to 1988 the estimated returns to scale 
was 1.25 on average, but declined gradually during the period analysed (Heshmati and Kumbhakar, 
1997). When subsidies were included as an input to calculate the returns to scale the scale elasticity 
was equal 0.84. This implies that subsidy payments reduce the scale economies, suggesting that 
subsides contribute to conserving the current farm structure in Norwegian grain farming. 
 
Yearly estimated technological change was statistical significant and positive at 8% per year, 
indicating reasonable growth in productivity over time. As expected, the region with average and least 
favourable production conditions had lower productivity than the region with most favourable 
production conditions. But the most important finding for the research objective was that the off-farm 
work share was not found to have any statistically significant influence on farm productivity. 
 
4.3.  Technically efficiency level 
 
For the prediction of technical inefficiency effects, it is common to use an output-oriented measure 
defined as the ratio of observed output to the corresponding stochastic frontier output:  
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This expression relies upon the value of the unobservable  it u  being predicted, which is achieved by 
deriving the expression for the expectation of  ( ) it u exp −  conditional on the observed value of 
() it it u v − . In practice we replace the ‘true’ parameter values by their estimates and ‘true’ residuals 
() it it u v −  by their predicted values. The exact formula for the conditional mean is given in Battese and 
Coelli (1988). 
 
The average technical efficiency for the sample, estimated with the full flexible model, was estimated 
to be 0.79. The implication is that, for the average farmer, crop production could have been 21% 
higher, without requiring more input. However, behind the mean there may be large variation between 
farms, as illustrated in the histogram in Figure  2. Almost 25% of the farmers have a technical 
efficiency levels less than 0.7, suggesting that they have a large potential for improvement. On the 
other hand, about 30% were (almost) technical efficient, with a technical efficiency score of 0.9 or 

























Figure 2. Distribution of the sample of grain farmers in Norway by technical efficiency. 
 
 
4.4.  Factors explaining the technically efficiency levels 
 
In the lower part of Table 3 above the determinants for variations in the efficiency score between 
farms are examined. The parameters indicate the direction of the effects these variables have upon 
inefficiency levels (where a negative parameters estimates shows that the variable has a positive 
effects on efficiency).  
 
The parameter for CV of farm revenues was positive, which indicates that farmers with low variability 
of revenue were more technically efficient than farmers with high variability (but the causation could 
also be the other way around). The same applied for subsidies − farmers with a low level of subsides 
were more technically efficient than farmers with higher subsidies, although the effect was small. 
Subsidies can be distorting, causing inefficiency, mainly in resource allocation and levels of input use 
(e.g. Lachaal, 1994; Barnes, 2006). One possible further explanation of the adverse effect of subsidies 
on efficiency is that larger scale farmers may strategically chose more extensive production while 
receiving a relatively large amount of non-product-specific subsidies because of their large farm areas. 
 
Unsurprisingly, farmers within a given region with relatively high crop yields were more technically 
efficient than farmers in that region with low crop yields. Wilson et al. (1998) and Wilson et al. (2001) 
found that managers with more experience are likely to be more efficient than those with fewer years 
of experience, which contrasts with our failure to find any significant difference in technical efficiency 
of non-experienced and experienced farmers.   
 
As for the stochastic frontier function, the predicted off-farm work share had no statistically 
significant influence on technical efficiency. These results are at variance with the work of Goodwin 
and Mishra (2004) who found for U.S. family farms that a greater involvement in off-farm labour 
markets decreases on-farm efficiency. Brümmer (2001) also found that full-time farmers were more 
technically efficient than others in Slovenia. However, our finding supports an earlier study of west 
Tennessee farmers, where Bagi (1984) concluded that the technical efficiency of part-time farms was   13
not systematically lower than that of full-time farms. Singh and Williamson (1981) also concluded that 
Tennessee part-time farmers were not more inefficient in production than full-time farmers in the same 
area. Chavas et al. (2005) found that off-farm earnings had a significant effect on allocative efficiency 
but no significant effect on technical efficiency on farms in Gambia.  
 
4.5.  Model limitations and possible extensions 
 
There are some limitations to this study. The model outlined in Figure 1 might not represent the 
relationships in the real world. Two main limitations come to mind.  
 
First, when investigating determinants of part-time farming and its effect on farm productivity and 
efficiency, it is reasonable to assume (or test) that the extent of off-farm work affects productivity and 
efficiency, as done in this study. But, it is also reasonable to assume that high farm productivity affects 
the extent of off-farm work. That is, the relationship is simultaneous not necessarily triangular. In 
other words, productivity may depend on off-farm work share and off-farm work share may depend on 
productivity. However, preliminary results of simultaneous estimation without inefficiency show that 
such simultaneity does not exit, i.e., we find that off-farm work share is not significant in determining 
output.
8 Thus, our results do not suffer from simultaneity bias. 
 
Second, we did not account for the possibility that support payments could affect the levels of the 
other inputs used as explanatory variables in the frontier production function. One option could be to 
treat subsidies as a facilitating input, so that the productivity function coefficients of other inputs are 




5.  Conclusions 
 
A priori, there are no obvious relationships between share of the owner’s and spouse’s hours worked 
off the farm and farm productivity and efficiency. A part-time farmer will have a different livelihood 
strategy to a full-time farmer, with less time for farm work and less financial dependence on farming 
income. These factors may contribute to reduced productivity and technical efficiency. On the other 
hand, less time for farming may induce a need for more effective production and more intensive labour 
and capital use.  
 
Agricultural policy in Norway does not distinguish between part-time and full-time farms in the 
payment support programs, although it is sometimes argued that full-time farmers should be 
prioritised. But on the other side of the argument, part-time farming may better promote rural viability 
etc. As a contribution to such policy debates and to help policy makers introduce better targeted 
agricultural policies, there is a need for more knowledge about what determines part-time farming and 
what its effects are on farm productivity and efficiency.  
                                                 
8 The model with inefficiency is more involved from econometric point of view and we are working on this. However, our 
preliminary results still support the notion that off-farm work share does not affect productivity.    14
 
The above analysis is a contribution towards meeting this need. Our results show what factors 
influence decisions by this sample of Norwegian farm households to undertake off- farm work. 
Moreover, and importantly, our analysis did not reveal any systematic differences in either farm 
productivity or technical efficiency between part-time and full-time farmers. On this evidence there 
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